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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
Reservations are usually bleak areas originally granted to the
Indians because they were isolated from the white community and
because the white community did not want the lands thus made
available to the Indians. 50 Indian response to those ghetto-like con-
ditions has been to desert reservation life. Nearly one-third of
America's Indian population had deserted the reservation by 1968.
In part, migration has been implemented by federal programs which
furnish relocation funds, but no post-vocational assistance is includ-
ed. Often these Indians migrating to urban areas know nothing
of the rudiments of city living, and Indians often experience diffi-
culty finding employment.5 1 Faced with such considerations, the
court made the proper decision regarding general assistance bene-
fits for off-reservation Indians from a sociological viewpoint.5
2
Since the decision rested heavily upon the language of the
Snyder Act, the question arises whether the other provisions of
the Snyder Act may be similarly applied. If this question may
be answered affirmatively, Indians living off the reservation
may receive assistance for education, relief of distress, conservation
of health, industrial assistance and advancement, development of
water supplies, employment of physicians, and suppression of liquor
and drugs. While such a holding is desirable in light of the history
of the affairs of the white man and the Indian, it may prove
to cause a repeal or amendment of the Snyder Act to limit such
benefits to the Indians because of real or alleged shortages of
revenues. However, a debt is owed to the American Indian which
has been ignored too long, and it is time that America began
to repay the debt by providing these and other services to Indians,
whether they live on or off the reservation.
RUSSELL J. MYHRE
INDIANS-RESERVATIONS-EFFECT OF LATER CONGRESSIONAL ACTS
ON ACT ESTABLISHING RESERVATION BOUNDARIES
Appellant, a municipal corporation, brought suit for a declaratory
judgment asserting that the Congressional Act of 1910,1 which
allowed for allotment and sale of certain Fort Berthold Indian Res-
50. See generally, D. BRowN, BuRy MY HEART AT WOUNDED KNEE (1970) for a history
of the creation of Indian reservations and the methods by which Indians were forced onto
them.
51. Note, Intdian8: Better Red Tran Dead?, 42 S. CAL. L. REv. 101, 118 (1969).
52. See Comment, 2 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 143 (1954).
1. Act of June 1, 1910, ch. 264, 36 Stat. 455.
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ervation lands, did not change the boundaries of the North Dakota
reservation, as established by the Congressional Act of 1891.2 Appel-
lant was attempting to retain criminal jurisdiction over Indians
committing crimes in New Town, North Dakota. The case arose
when the Solicitor for the Department of the Interior issued an
opinion3 concerning the effect of the Act of 1910 on the Act of
1891 which had established the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation.
The Soicitor concluded, contrary to previous administrative prac-
tice and an earlier opinion of the Deputy Commissioner of Indian
Affairs,4 that the Act of 1910 had not altered the reservation
boundaries which remained the same as those established by the
Act of 1891; that no authority existed for the alteration of the
boundaries by administrative practice; and that the City of New
Town was within the exterior boundaries of the reservation, which
is Indian Country for jurisdictional purposes.5 The Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of New Town's application
for a declaratory judgment6 which would have allowed it jurisdic-
tion over the Indians in New Town. The court declared the boundaries
of the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation to be those established
by the Act of 1891, unaltered by the Act of 1910. New Town v.
United States, 454 F.2d 121 (8th Cir. 1972).
The land in question, originally part of an extensive area of
land held by the Three Affiliated Tribes 7 by treaty," was substan-
tially diminished by several Executive Orders and Acts of Congress.
Beginning in 1868 approximately 11,500,000 acres of land were taken
from the Indians by Executive Orders for railroads and white
settlers.9 Government representatives drafted an agreement in 1886
by which the Fort Berthold Indians would cede approximately
2. Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 543, 26 Stat. 989.
3. Opinion of the Solicitor, Department of the Interior, Memorandum M-36802, Mar.
13, 1970.
4. Letter from Deputy Commissioner of Indian Affairs to Director Aberdeen Area
Office, July 31, 1962. [hereinafter referred to as Crow letter].
5. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1949) defines Indian Country as:
(a) "[A]II land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the juris-
diction of the United States government, notwithstanding the issuance of
any patent, and, including rights-of-way running through the reservation,
(b) all dependent Indian communities within the borders of the United
States whether within the original or subsequently acquired territory there-
of, and whether within or without the limits of a state, and (c) all In-
dian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, In-
cluding rights-of-way running through the same."
6. Entered pursuant to an unreported opinion by Hon. George S. Register, Chief
Judge of the U.S. District Court for the District of North Dakota.
7. Co-defendant, a corporate entity succeeding to the interests of the Arkara, Gros
Ventre, and Mandan Tribes of Indians, was organized under the Indian Reorganization
Act of 1934, 25 U.S.C. § 461 et seq. (1971).
8. Treaty of Fort Laramie, 11 Stat. 749 (1851). For general background see Fort
Berthold Reservation v. United States, 390 F.2d 686, 688, 689 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
9. Exec. Order of August 18, 1868; April 12, 1870; July 13, 1880. Exec. Orders of
April 12, 1870, and July 13, 1880, are found in United States Laws and Statutes 1 INDIAN
AFFAIRs, LAW AND TREATIES, (1904). The Executive Orders are cited in Fort Berthold
Indians v. United States, 71 Ct. Cl. 308, 337-40 (1930).
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2,000,000 more acres for $800,000.10 Congress ratified the 1886 agree-
ment on March 3, 1891 with an important clause providing that
after allotments were made to individual Indians the residue of
the land "[s] hall be held by the said tribes of Indians as a
reservation.""
The Act of 1910 was the next piece of legislation to affect
this area of land. This Act directed the Secretary of the Interior
to dispose of certain surplus lands in accordance with the general
provisions of the homestead and townsite laws of the United States; 12
to cause allotment of a set number of acres north and east of
the Missouri River to each member of the Tribes; 13 and to reserve
from sale, allotment, or disposal all coal and mineral lands, lands
for agency, school, and religious purposes, and timber and other
lands."4 It was provided that all lands included in the Act were
still subject to Federal Jurisdiction through the application of federal
laws such as the one prohibiting the introduction of intoxicants
to Indian Country. 15 The Act concluded with the provision:
[t]hat nothing in this Act shall be construed to deprive said
Indians of Fort Berthold Indian Reservation of any benefits
to which they are entitled under existing treaties or agree-
ment not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act. 16
A brief statement of several principles of Indian law seems
appropriate at this point. It has long been established that Congress
has plenary power over tribal property, relations, and funds. 7 This
plenary power is not subject to review by the judiciary.' This
enables Congress to dispose of tribal lands without the consent
of the tribe," and it exists despite the fact that Indians have been
made citizens. 20 Through its plenary power Congress has guaranteed
reservation Indians that they will be subject only to federal and
tribal jurisdiction.
2 1
Congressional Acts evidencing the exercise of this plenary power
10. Cited in Fort Berthold Reservation v. United States, 390 F.2d 686 (Ct. C1. 1968).
11. Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 543 § 23, Art. 10, 26 Stat. 1032, 1035.
12. Act of June 1, 1910, ch. 264 §§ 1, 9, 36 Stat. 455, 457.
13. Act of June 1, 1910, ch. 264 § 2, 36 Stat. 455.
14. Act of June 1, 1910, ch. 264 §§ 1, 3, 5, 10, 36 Stat. 455, 456, 4,58.
15. Act of June 1, 1910, ch. 264, § 13, 36 Stat. 455, 458.
16. Act of June 1, 1910, ch. 264, § 14, 36 Stat. 455, 459.
17. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903); Simmons v. Eagle Seelatsee, 244
F. Supp. 808 (E.D. Wash. 1965); United States v. 21,250 Acres of Land, 161 F. Supp.
376 (W.D.N.Y. 1957) ; Bond v. Thorn, 25 F. Supp. 157 (N.D. Okla. 1938), aff'd 8ub nzomn.
United States v. Bond, 180 F.2d 504 (10th Cir. 1939).
18. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903).
19. United States v. 21,250 Acres of Land, 161 F. Supp. 367, 379, (W.D.N.Y. 1957).
20. Simmons v. Eagle Seelatsee, 244 F. Supp. 808, 813 (E.D. Wash. 1965).
21. United States v. Minnesota, 95 F.2d 468 (8th Cir. 1938), aff'd sub nom. Minnesota
V. United States, 305 U.S. 382 (1939); United States v. Calvard, 89 F.2d 312 (4.th Cir.
1937); State v. Jackson, 218 Minn. 429, 16 N.W.2d 752 (1944). 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1949).
F. COHEN, HANDBOOK ON INDIAN LAw 310 (1945), 5 ARIz. L. REv. 131 (1963).
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have created problems for the courts when dealing with Indian
lands, reservations, and jurisdiction. Courts have developed a number
of principles to serve as guidelines for cases resolving jurisdictional
conflicts involving the interpretation of such acts.22 These principles
indicate that unless Congress expressly declares a provision of
a prior act to be superceded, it will remain in effect.
In deciding the instant case the court expressed primary reliance
on three principles. The court stated:
(1) When Congress has once established a reservation, all
tracts included within it remain a part of the reservation
until separated therefrom by Congress. United States v. Cel-
estine, 215 U.S. 278, 285... (1909). Thus, there is no author-
ity for an administrative alteration of boundaries as the
Crow letter implies.
(2) The purpose to abrogate treaty rights of Indians is not
to be lightly imputed to Congress. Menominee Tribe of In-
dians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404... (1968).
(3) The opening of an Indian reservation for settlement by
homesteading is not inconsistent with its continued existence
as a reservation. Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351
... (1962). 2
The principles of United States v. Celestine and Menominee Tribe
of Indians v. United States are general principles of law for dealing
with Indian reservation boundaries established by congressional acts.
They clearly indicate the position the court will take in looking




Like the present case, Seymour involved interpretation of the
effect of a later act2 5 upon an earlier Executive Order establishing
22. Among these principles are: The intention to change Indian Rights is not to be
lightly imputed to Congress. Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404,
412 (1968). The allotment of lands in severalty which are within the boundaries of an
established reservation does not dis-establish a reservation* or exclude the allotment from
it. Tooisgah v. United States, 186 F.2d 93, 97 (10th Cir. 1950). Once a reservation has
been established, all tracts within it remain a part of the reservation until separated
therefrom by Congress. United States v. Celestine, 215 U.S. 278, 285 (1909). Statutes
terminating Indian property rights should be construed narrowly, but the intention of
Congress may not be ignored if it appears plainly in the statute. United States ex rel.
Shoshone Indian Tribe v. Seaton, 248 F.2d 154, 155 (D.C. Cir. 1957). Uncertainties are
to be construed favorably to the Indians rather than the government. United States v.
Shoshone Tribe, 304 U.S. 111, 117 (1938). The court must determine in each instance
whether Congress has exercised guardianship over Indian property or whether it has
exercised a right of eminent domain. Klamath and Modoc Tribes v. United States, 436
F 2d 1008, 2015 (Ct. C1. 1971). Administrative interpretation of an act is not entitled to
controlling weight when. disputes arise. Lafferty v. State ex rel. Jameson, 80 S.D. 411,
125 N.W.2d 171, 174 (1963). An interpretation by a later Congress of the intent of earlier
legislation does not control the meaning of such legislation. Rainwater v. United States,
356 U.S. 590, 593 (1958). See also S.E.C. v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180,
199, 200 (1963) ; United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l. Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 348, 349 (1963).
23. New Town v. United States, 454 F.2d 121, 125 (8th Cir. 1972).
24. Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351 (1962).
25. Act of March 22, 1906, ch. 1126, 34 Stat, 80 [hereinafter referred to as Act of
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the reservation.2  The Supreme Court ruled that the Act of 1906
did not change the reservation boundaries, and that the land re-
mained Indian Country 27 for jurisdictional purposes:
The Act did no more than open the way for non-Indian set-
tlers to own land on the reservation in a manner which the
Federal Government, acting as guardian and trustee for the
Indians, regarded as beneficial to the development of its
wards. [Emphasis added] .2
There are many important similarities between the effect of the
Act of 1906 on the Colville Reservation and the effect of the Act
of 1910 on the Fort Berthold Reservation. 29 The Act of 1910 contains
affirmative terms which serve as an indication of congressional
intent to preserve the reservation status throughout the entire area
deemed a reservation by the Act of 1891. In the Act of 1910 the
Secretary of the Interior is authorized to reserve from allotment
to individual Indians any lands with coal or other mineral despoits;
all tracts valuable for power or reservoir sites;s' all timber lands;3 2
and areas for parks, schools and other public purposes; no compen-
sation being paid for these areas. These affirmative propositions
reinforce the decision in New Town, independently of Seymour and
demonstrate the importance of interpreting the intention of congres-
sional acts by viewing them in their entirety.
There are few decisions conflicting with New Town and Seymour
although a few South Dakota cases have reached a different result.3 4
However these cases are distinguishable as they involve acts with
language expressly construed to diminish the lands of Indian reser-
vations.3 5 It may also be noted that the effect of these two cases
1906]. This statute concerned the opening of the southern half of the Colville Indian
Reservation to sale and settlement under the general homestead and townsite laws.
26. Executive Order of President Grant, 1872, noted in 1 KAPPLER, INDIAN AFFAIRS,
LAWS AND TREATIES 916 (2d ed. 1904).
27. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1151, 1152, 1153 (1971).
28. Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351, 356 (1962).
29. Both the Act of March 22, 1906, ch. 1126, 34 Stat. 80, and Act of June 1, 1910,
ch. 264, 36 Stat. 455 provide for: 1. Allotment to members of the tribes and sale to out-
siders of surplus lands not needed for allotments or reserves (1906 Act, §§ 2, 3; 1910
Act, §§ 2, 8); 2. Appraisal of the lands and disposition at an appraised price under the
general homestead laws of the United States (1906 Act, §§ 3, 4; 1910 Act, §§ 7, 8, 9) ; 3.
Proceeds of the sale to be deposited In the United States treasury for the benefit of
the Indians (1906 Act, § 6; 1910 Act, § 11) ; 4. The open area to be considered Indian
Country for the purpose of application of Indian liquor laws (1906 Act, § 13 as amended;
1910 Act § 13) ; 5. The United States not to be bound to secure purchases but merely to
act as a trustee for the Indians (1906 Act, § 9; 1910 Act, 14).
30. Act of June 1, 1910, oh. 264. § 1, 36 Stat. 455.
31. Act of June 1, 1910, oh. 264, § 5, 36 Stat. 455, 456.
32. Act of June 1, 1910, ch. 264, § 10, 36 Stat. 455, 458.
33. Act of June 1, 1910, oh. 264, § 6, 36 Stat 455, 456.
34. State ex rel. Hollow Horn Bear v. Jameson, 77 S.D. 527, 95 N.W.2d 181 (1959)
State ex rel. Erickson, 141 N.W.2d 1 (S.D. 1966) ; Lafferty v. State ex rel. Jameson, 80
S.D. 411, 125 N.W.2d 171 (1963) ; State v. Barnes, 137 N.W.2d 683 (S.D. 1965).
35. Act of May 27, 1910, ch. 257, 36 Stat. 440 was interpreted In State ex tel. Hollow
Horn Bear v. Jameson, 77 S.D. 527, 95 N.W.2d 181 (1959), and State ex rel. Swift v.
414
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on South Dakota's jurisdiction over Indians has been questioned
by Judge Lay of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in
his dissenting opinion in United States ex rel. Miner v. Erickson,88
and in two recent South Dakota cases the state court has not
followed this authority, but recognized instead the line of cases
represented by the Seymour and New Town decisions.87
Later Congressional and administrative acts are of little assis-
tance in the interpretation of Congressional intent with regard to
Fort Berthold. The later acts are plagued with inconsistencies.
Legislative and administrative acts immediately following the Act
of 1910 reaffirm the reservation boundaries as being those established
by the Act of 1891. 81 In 1916 inconsistencies began to develop
in legislative drafts and the reservation was sometimes referred
to as the "former" or "formerly" Fort Berthold Reservation. 9 The
court in New Town remarked that the inconsistencies within later
acts and statutes prevent finding any clear intent of Congress
to diminish the Fort Berthold Reservation. 40
Administrative interpretation of the boundaries of the reserva-
tion are equally unreliable in interpreting the Act of 1910. Similar
to Congressional interpretation, administrative interpretation con-
temporaneous with the Act of 1910 viewed the boundaries of the
reservation as preserved.4 1 The inconsistencies of later administra-
tive opinions were one reason the City of New Town initiated
this law suit, as a review of the Crow letter 2 and the Solicitor's
opinion 43 will verify.
The New Town case may be exemplary of the problems which
will be raised in actions brought to determine reservation boundaries.
Erickson. 141 N.W.2d 1 (S.D. 1966) as diminishing the Pine Ridge Reservation. But they
may be distinguished since the Act contained the vrovision: "[T]hat any Indians to whom
allotments have been made on the tract to 'be ceded may . . . elect to do so before said
lands are offered for sale, relinquish same and select allotments in lieu thereof on the
diminished reservations . Act of May 27, 1910, ch. 257, § 1, 36 Stat. 44.0 (emphasis
added).
36. United States ex rel. Miner v. Erickson, 428 F.2d 623, 637 (8th Cir. 1970).
37. South Dakota v. Congram, (8th Cir., February 10, 1972) ; South Dakota v. Molash,
(8th Cir., February 10, 1971).
38. E.g., Act of May 24, 1924, ch. 180, 43 Stat. 139, "[Llands within the Fort Berthold
Indian Reservation"; Act of August 3, 1914, ch. 224, 38 Stat. 681, "[L]ands in the Fort
Berthoid Indian Reservation, North Dakota."
39. See, e.g., Act of October 29, 1949, ch. 790, 63 Stat. 1026; Act of May 10, 1920, ch.
178, 41 Stat. 595; Act of March 3, 1917, ch. 168, 39 Stat. 1131; Act of May 18, 1916, ch.
125, 39 Stat. 123, 144.
40. New Town v. United States, 454 F.2d 121, 125, 126 (8th Cir. 1972).
41. E.g., Presidential Proclamation, September 17, 1915, 39 Stat. 1748. "[A]ll the
lands in the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation. 1912 REoRT OF THE COMMIssIONER OF
INDIAN APFArRs at 60; [W~ithin that part of the reservation lying North and East of the
river"; 1910 REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFFAIRS at 31; Presidential Procla-
mation, June 29, 1911, 37 Stat. 1693.
42. Letter of Deputy Commissioner of Indian Affairs to Director Aberdeen Area Of-
fice, July 31, 1962.
43. Opinion of the Solicitor, Department of the Interior, Memorandum M-36802, Mar.
18, 1970.
415
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More disputes on jurisdiction are likely as attorneys and their
Indian clients become increasingly aware that administrative opin-
ions and practices do not establish Indian reservation boundaries
and jurisdiction. The New Town and Seymour decisions provide
the courts with more definite and valuable guidelines to follow
in interpreting the effect of conflicting statutes.
Few congressional acts and few Indian cases are so identical
in fact and substance as to allow universal application of the
rationale of the New Town case. When applicable, the result may
present very real problems for cities and towns caught in a jurisdic-
tional web hampering local law enforcement, credit and collection
of debts, taxes and special assessments, and zoning. Congressional
separation of the town from the reservation presents a partial
solution,"4 but the effect will be checkerboard jurisdiction with
obvious conflicts.45 However, few legal or policy arguments can
be made in favor of "bending" statutory interpretation to absolve
or avoid such conflicts. Indians have not had a history of sophisti-
cated use of the American legal system. The Three Affiliated Tribes
have already lost 13,500,000 acres of land that they originally held
by treaties. 4  In return they have been given the guarantee of
a Federal reservation and Federal jurisdiction.47 They should not
lose these rights simply because it would be more convenient for
nearby municipalities.
JOHN V. BOULGER
44. This was proposed as a partial solution to the problems of local law enforcement
in Parker, Arizona. Parker, like New Town. is a largely non-Indian community which
grew on the Colville Indian Reservation and was determined to be in Indian Country in
Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351 (1962). Non-Indians committing major crimes
in Parker are subject to local Jurisdiction while Indians are subject to Federal Jurisdic-
tion exclusively for such crimes and probably for misdemeanors as well. Congressional
separation of Parker and New Town from the reservations would eliminate these dis-
tinctions and the very real problem they create in local law enforcement. 5 ARIz. L.
Rv. 131, 134 (1963).
45. See, e.g., State v. Barnes, 137 N.W.2d 683 (S.D. 1965). This case Is similar to the
present case as it arose on a motion to determine criminal jurisdiction. A murder of an
Indian by a non-Indian took place on a road between two tracts of land over which
there was a dispute as to derivation of title. The Supreme Court of South Dakota re-
versed a circuit court and found that the locus of the crime, although formerly within the
boundaries of the Cheyenne River Reservation, was not restored to the reservation by
the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 and therefore was not Indian Country subject to
exclusive Federal jurisdiction. For law enforcement officers the perplexity of the situa-
tion may be seen as almost necessitating their consulting a map with Federal, state, and
local Jurisdiction represented, if there could possibly be agreement on their respective
extent, before attempting to fulfill any part of their duties.
46. Fort Berthold Indian Reservation v. United States, 390 F.2d 686, 689 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
47. Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 593, § 23, Art 10, 26 Stat. 989, 1035; United States v.
Minnesota, 95 F.2d 468 (8th Cir. 1938), af f'd sub hom. Minnesota v. United States, 305
U.S. 382 (1939) ; United States v. Calvard, 89 F.2d 312 (4th Cir. 1937) ; State v. Jackson,
218 Minn. 429, 16 N.W.2d 752 (1944). 18 U.S.C. §§ 1151 (1949) et seq.; F. CounE, HAND-
BooX oW F DA INDLN LAW 310 (1945) ; 5 ARIZ. I REV. 131 (1963).
